The Objection of Teleostability: Why Does Life Persist in a World Subject to Entropy?

Symbolic baroque illustration depicting the allegory of cosmic stability (Stabilitas): a feminine figure, a radiant divine eye, and a shrimp — evoking the persistence of order amidst chaos.

Teleostability (from the Greek τέλος, telos, end or purpose, and the Latin stabilitas, stability) designates the property — or rather, the conceptual enigma — whereby an organized order, whether biological or cosmological, not only arises within a chaotic and purposeless material framework, but above all persists, stabilizes, intensifies, and generalizes, enduring against entropic and destructive forces.

It raises not merely the question of the initial emergence of order, but its ontological inertia: why, in a universe where the fundamental forces are blind and devoid of intent, would a structured order continue to exist rather than instantly collapse back into chaos? This objection does not target a marginal weakness of materialism, but uncovers a central fault line, one that demands an explanation beyond the confines of brute physicality.

Introduction

While debates surrounding the emergence of life are often intense, they remain incomplete as long as they fail to address an even more fundamental question: not simply why life appeared, but why it endures.

In a material universe where entropy — according to the second law of thermodynamics — inevitably drives all systems toward disorder and dissipation, biological order poses a deep enigma: how can we explain not only that life emerged in spite of staggering improbability, but that it persisted, stabilized, and even evolved toward increasingly refined organization?

This is the paradox we refer to as the objection of teleostability. Even if we grant materialism the possibility that a living system might arise by sheer chance, it remains utterly unable to explain how such a complex, structured, and goal-oriented order continues to resist disintegration, maintaining itself, reproducing, adapting, and diversifying across the ages.

Faced with this reality, materialism confronts a major impasse: absent any finality or inherent direction inscribed in fundamental laws, how can it justify the very persistence of life within a framework where, rationally, nothing guarantees durable stability? Why does biological order, far from vanishing into chaos, establish itself as an omnipresent, dynamic, and resilient phenomenon?

What we shall demonstrate is that this objection goes far beyond a mere probabilistic difficulty: it strikes at the very heart of the materialist project, which proves incapable of accounting for the continuity of an oriented order. According to the very criteria of Ockham’s Razor, only a transcendent, stable, and unifying hypothesis offers a rational and economically superior explanation — a hypothesis Catholic philosophy has been articulating for centuries.

In the following text, we will examine the rational strength of this objection, the Catholic responses it has provoked, and the most serious scientific and logical challenges raised against it.

I – Precise Exposition of the Argument: Life Versus Entropy

The question of life’s persistence within a universe governed by entropy deserves careful scrutiny: if the initial emergence of an ordered phenomenon can, at a stretch, be attributed to an improbable conjunction of random events, its stability and continuity raise an entirely different kind of problem.

Biological order, by its very definition, is marked by specific properties: self-organization, faithful replication, long-term adaptability, and the continual correction of internal errors. Yet none of the fundamental physical laws — be it gravity, electromagnetism, or even thermodynamics — intrinsically contains any predisposition to spontaneously produce a stable order capable of maintaining itself over time in the midst of ambient disorder.

The second law of thermodynamics is central here: any isolated system naturally tends toward disorder (an increase in entropy). As Arthur Eddington famously summarized:

“If your theory is found to be against the second law of thermodynamics, I can give you no hope — there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation.”(The Nature of the Physical World, 1928)

This law is not a marginal principle but a universal observation, rigorously confirmed. Even in the event of an accidental emergence of temporary order, such order would be naturally destined to dissolve swiftly into generalized chaos.

Yet life persistently defies this trend: not only does it preserve internal order, but it increases its degree of organization, develops new complex structures, adapts to diverse environments, and above all, persists across generations with astonishing stability. As Erwin Schrödinger wrote when introducing the concept of "negative entropy" (or negentropy):

“A living organism avoids decay into thermodynamic equilibrium — that is, death — by feeding on negative entropy.”(What is Life?, 1944)

From the microscopic level (cells, bacteria) to the macroscopic (multicellular organisms, complex ecosystems), living systems exhibit a kind of organizing inertia that, in strictly materialist terms, remains astonishing and inexplicable.

Even Jacques Monod, a staunch defender of materialist biology, acknowledged the enigma:

“The apparent purposefulness of biological structures, their teleonomy, is one of the great scientific problems.”(Chance and Necessity, 1970)

This fundamental observation leads to a notion that is both essential and inescapable: that of teleonomy — the internal finality observed in living beings. Even without any reference to reflective consciousness, life appears oriented toward endurance, toward transmission, and toward the continual refinement of its structures. Yet this internal orientation (teleonomy) finds no explicit justification within a purely materialist framework: physical laws are descriptive, not prescriptive; they describe how matter behaves, but do not establish any intrinsic purpose, nor any imperative to maintain order over time.

As Hans Jonas writes in The Phenomenon of Life (1966):

“The fundamental and mysterious fact is not only that life exists, but that it cares about itself.”

Thus, the objection of teleostability does not merely question the probability of life’s emergence. It exposes instead a structural contradiction within materialism, which proves incapable of accounting for the biological order’s resistance to the ever-present pressure of entropy. This contradiction compels us to consider the existence of a transcendent principle — one that is simpler, more stable, and more rational according to logical standards and the principle of Ockham’s Razor — a principle that would coherently explain the emergence, endurance, and dynamic evolution of life itself.

It is precisely this transcendent hypothesis, developed notably within Catholic philosophy, that we shall now examine as the most rational and robust response to the profound paradox of the living.

II – The Catholic Response: A Coherent and Simple Solution (Application of Ockham’s Razor)

Faced with the deep enigma posed by the objection of teleostability, the Catholic framework offers a rational, simple, and coherent response that merits close examination.

The Catholic position rests on a clear affirmation: the order of living beings — their stability and endurance — is not accidental nor inexplicable, but refers to a transcendent, unique, stable, and eternal principle: God. According to Catholic metaphysics, as clearly expounded by Saint Thomas Aquinas:

“It belongs to God to be the principle of existence for other beings.”(Summa Contra Gentiles, II, ch. 6)

He is the origin and the enduring foundation of the order of reality, which includes the remarkable stability of life. This transcendent finality is not only an efficient explanation, but also the simplest one, according to the very standards of the famous principle known as Ockham’s Razor.

Ockham’s Razor, formulated in the 14th century by William of Ockham, states:

Frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora — “It is pointless to do with more what can be done with fewer.”

In other words: among several competing explanatory hypotheses, one should favor the one that invokes the fewest distinct entities, the least complexity, while retaining full explanatory power.

Applied to our problem, Ockham’s Razor identifies as superior any hypothesis that explains the origin, permanence, and teleonomy of living beings by a single foundational principle — rather than one that must appeal to a multitude of extraordinary coincidences, improbable chances, and perfectly fine-tuned conditions at every moment, without a clear unifying basis.

Even committed materialist scientists acknowledge the growing burden of strictly naturalistic explanations. Richard Dawkins, one of the most ardent defenders of neo-Darwinism, writes:

“Biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.”(The Blind Watchmaker, 1986)

He then attempts to demonstrate that natural selection suffices to explain this appearance — yet he implicitly admits the immense explanatory difficulty of the materialist framework.

Indeed, the materialist perspective requires, at each stage of life’s persistence, a near-infinite chain of fortuitous events, remarkably favorable and stable initial conditions, and finely tuned, repeated interactions with the environment. This unceasing accumulation of random coincidences excessively complicates the explanation, rendering it increasingly implausible as we consider the longevity and escalating complexity of living phenomena.

As the philosopher Thomas Nagel — himself an atheist — noted in Mind and Cosmos (2012):

“The neo-Darwinian conception of nature is almost certainly false.”

Nagel emphasizes that current materialist explanations fail to account for the emergence and stability of both consciousness and life.

By contrast, the Catholic perspective proposes a single transcendent cause encompassing all particularities: God, as the ordering principle, ensures both the possibility of initial emergence, enduring stability, and the intrinsic teleonomy of living systems. This singular cause is at once simpler and more rational — precisely because it explains the totality of the phenomenon (origin, stability, adaptation, evolution) through a single first principle.

As Saint Augustine writes in his Confessions (Book XI, 4):

“You are stable, and You stand immovable; and yet, You move Yourself, and all things move toward You.”

The Catholic explanation does not merely fill a temporary scientific gap (which would make it a "God of the gaps") — it offers a truly stable, coherent, and comprehensive metaphysical framework capable of explaining why life does not immediately devolve into chaos, but instead endures.

The principle of explanatory economy enshrined in Ockham’s Razor thus grants clear superiority to the Catholic position over strict materialism: it is simpler, clearer, more stable, and more comprehensive.

It is from this rational observation and metaphysical coherence that we now proceed to confront the Catholic position with the major objections it may face from contemporary scientific and philosophical thought — so as to test its logical and explanatory robustness.

III – Critical Examination of Major Objections and Detailed Responses

In response to the objection of teleostability, several scientific and philosophical arguments may be raised in defense of a strictly materialist framework. Let us here rigorously analyze the most serious among them, while providing solid and rational rebuttals.

Objection 1: “Evolutionary mechanisms alone account for the persistence of life”

Content of the objection: Modern biology demonstrates that natural selection and genetic mutations suffice to explain how life maintains order over time. No additional principle is required, since every organism that survives simply transmits advantageous traits allowing for sustainable continuity.

Detailed response:

The theory of evolution can only function if it already presupposes the existence of a stable system capable of replication and self-correction upon which it acts. In other words, evolutionary mechanisms cannot explain why life initially possesses these self-replicating, reparative, and adaptive properties. Natural selection explains how living beings change, but it does not account for why a structured order is maintained in spite of the rising entropy in the surrounding environment. The persistence of these mechanisms is precisely the enigma we raise: biological evolution presupposes what it ought to explain.

Objection 2: “The vast size of the universe makes biological order statistically plausible”

Content of the objection: Given the universe’s vastness, even the most improbable phenomena must inevitably occur somewhere. Thus, the persistence of life is merely a statistical consequence, requiring no transcendent explanation.

Detailed response: This statistical reasoning explains only partially — and very imperfectly — the chance appearance of a complex system. It does nothing to resolve the question of its continued stability. The issue at hand is not merely the one-time appearance of an unlikely phenomenon, but its constant recurrence and progressive extension under highly diverse conditions. The universe’s immensity does not make sustained resistance to entropy more likely; it simply relocates the problem. It cannot explain why complex and dynamic order persists against ambient chaos without any stable internal direction.

Objection 3: “The theory of self-organization (Ilya Prigogine) accounts for biological order”

Content of the objection: According to Nobel laureate Ilya Prigogine, certain physical systems far from thermodynamic equilibrium can spontaneously generate lasting order. Life, then, is merely a special case of spontaneous self-organization, explicable within classical physics.

Detailed response: This theory indeed explains the localized formation of temporary orders under highly specific conditions. But it fails to account for the stable, cumulative, and adaptive persistence characteristic of living beings. The self-organizing structures studied by Prigogine are limited in their complexity and dissolve quickly once external energy sources or precise conditions disappear. Life, by contrast, persists by constantly adapting its conditions of existence, establishing a lasting stability transmitted through generations. Spontaneous self-organization may account for transient states of order — but not for permanence, cumulative evolution, and the continuous transmission of highly specific order.

Objection 4: “Invoking God violates Ockham’s Razor by adding an unnecessary hypothesis”

Content of the objection: Invoking God introduces a superfluous hypothesis, thereby violating Ockham’s Razor. A purely naturalistic, material explanation should be preferred.

Detailed response: This objection stems from a misunderstanding of Ockham’s Razor: it does not automatically reject non-material causes, but rather favors the simplest and most comprehensive explanation. Now, the hypothesis of a single transcendent principle (God) is in fact simpler and more parsimonious than a proliferation of partial, circumstantial, random, and cumulative explanations — each of which accounts only for narrow aspects of the phenomenon. In truth, strict materialism, by multiplying coincidences and fine-tuned conditions for the origin and maintenance of life, violates Ockham’s Razor far more egregiously than the unique transcendent cause proposed by Catholic philosophy.

Objection 5: “Life needs no intrinsic finality — this is merely anthropomorphic projection”

Content of the objection: The notion of teleonomy or finality in living beings is but a subjective human projection onto nature. Life persists for no particular reason — simply by mechanical reproduction and selection.

Detailed response: The concept of finality invoked here does not imply conscious intention, but rather an objective orientation of living systems toward self-preservation and development. This orientation is not a mere psychological projection but an empirically observable scientific fact: living beings clearly exhibit an internal, stable, and continuous orientation toward replication, adaptation, and survival. It is thus an objective property of living systems that requires a proper and rational explanation, not a dismissive psychological dismissal.

Objection 6: “The multiverse or the infinity of universes solves the problem”

Content of the objection: According to some contemporary (as yet unproven) hypotheses in speculative cosmology, an infinite number of parallel universes — a multiverse — might exist, in which all possible combinations of physical laws, structures, and events are realized somewhere. Within this framework, the emergence and persistence of life, however improbable, would become statistically inevitable, since they must occur in at least one universe. There would thus be no need to invoke a transcendent finality: we merely happen to find ourselves in one of the rare stable-life-permitting universes.

Detailed response: This hypothesis, though elegant in appearance, in fact merely defers the problem without resolving it.

– It fails to explain local order: Even in an infinite multiverse, the local problem of life’s enduring internal stability remains. Explaining that “elsewhere, everything fails” does not clarify why, here, mechanisms not only function initially but continue to do so without collapsing under entropic cycles. The question is not simply why order appears momentarily, but why it possesses organizing inertia.

– It does not resolve the mystery of the multiverse’s own order:  A multiverse, if it exists, must still rest on some meta-framework of laws — physical or metaphysical — governing its operation. Why does such a framework exist rather than nothing? Why does it permit self-coherent universes capable of generating stable complexity? Postulating brute infinity fails to explain the origin of this structure or why it enables the persistence of life. The question is merely displaced upward, not dissolved.

– By Ockham’s Razor, it is vastly more costly:  To introduce an infinity of universes in order to explain one local phenomenon is massively more complex and less economical than positing a single transcendent unifying principle. Properly applied, Ockham’s Razor does not favor speculative layering, but the identification of a simple, stable, and unique cause that accounts for the whole. The multiverse fails in this regard: it introduces an unprovable and bloated architecture, whereas the theistic hypothesis remains conceptually leaner and more explanatory

– It remains dependent on the Weak Anthropic Principle: Finally, the multiverse argument still relies on an observational bias: “We observe a universe that permits life because otherwise we wouldn’t be here to observe it.” But this is not a causal explanation — only a logical sidestep. It offers no positive reason why things are the way they are.

In short :  The multiverse, the infinity of repetitions, or the infinite trial strategy do not solve the teleostability enigma — they simply push it back without addressing it. They introduce massive speculative burdens, violating the principle of explanatory economy, and leave the core question unanswered: Why order rather than universal chaos? Why a structured frame enabling persistence and complexity in the first place?

The Catholic response, by positing a single transcendent ordering principle, preserves both simplicity and explanatory power, where materialist hypotheses drown in sterile complexity.

Objection 7: “Given enough time and trials, finality eventually emerges”

Content of the objection: The classic materialist argument asserts that even the most improbable events (such as the emergence of life) will eventually occur if enough time and enough trials are granted. That is, over billions of years and nearly infinite attempts, no metaphysical hypothesis is needed to account for life, its maintenance, or its evolution.

Detailed response:

– Adverse constraints increase with complexity: The more complex a system becomes, the more vulnerable it is to external disruptions (predation, extinction, environmental shifts) and internal imbalances. Even if time multiplies the “rolls of the dice,” the probability that a complex system survives for long actually decreases as these threats accumulate. The materialist argument ignores this: it assumes that the mere passage of time suffices to create and preserve order, without accounting for the rising pressures working against it.

– The emergence of teleonomy is not guaranteed by chance: Even the simplest living systems exhibit systemic orientation: they repair themselves, reproduce, endure. But why should randomness not only produce complex order, but also order endowed with an implicit finality — an internal orientation toward self-preservation? Natural selection may amplify such tendencies once they appear, but it cannot explain their initial emergence. Why would inert matter spontaneously generate systems that are not only improbable, but self-maintaining?

– This is not merely a question of probability, but of structural orientation: The issue is not that a highly improbable configuration appears once. It is to understand why this configuration inherently tends to resist chaos and replicate itself. This is not just a statistical outcome — it is an organized dynamic, a teleonomy, that exceeds what raw probabilities can account for.

In brief: The materialist argument based on “time and trials” fails to consider growing constraints, the origin of teleonomy, and the structural drive toward self-maintenance. These elements call for a deeper explanation. Once again, the theistic and Catholic response — positing a first, ordering and finalizing principle — offers a simpler, unified, and more rational hypothesis in accord with Ockham’s Razor, whereas the probabilistic stack collapses under its own weight.

Objection 8: “Stability is a brute fact; there is no need to question it”

Content of the objection: Some materialist philosophers claim that asking “why is there stability” is a meaningless question. The universe is as it is; its laws require no justification. To seek a cause for stability is an unjustified human projection.

Detailed response: Refusing to ask the question of grounding does not eliminate the question — it merely suspends the effort to think. In all scientific disciplines, we seek to understand the origins of forces, constants, and structures. Why should we halt our inquiry precisely where the stakes are highest? This refusal is, in truth, a philosophical stance — a retreat — but it offers no positive explanation. As Étienne Gilson aptly put it:

“Absurdity is not an explanation; it is the absence of one.”

Objection 9: “This is a teleological fallacy — you project purpose where there is none”

Content of the objection: To attribute purpose or orientation to living beings is an anthropomorphic fallacy. Living systems aim at nothing; they merely operate through mechanical laws.

Detailed response: The notion of teleonomy, well established in biology, does not imply conscious intention, but rather a systemic internal orientation: living systems replicate, correct, adapt. This is not a human projection, but an objective and measurable property. Asking about the origin of this orientation is thus entirely legitimate and rational.

Objection 10: “Natural selection and localized materialist explanations suffice”

Content of the objection:There is no need to invoke a transcendent cause, as mechanisms like natural selection, self-organization, or stabilized fluctuations adequately explain the persistence of life.

Detailed response: These mechanisms already presuppose a stable framework on which they act. Natural selection, for instance, assumes beings capable of replicating and reliably transmitting traits — which is precisely the enigma at hand. Local explanations do not account for the global question: why does this stable framework exist, why are physical laws fine-tuned, why does a cumulative direction emerge against entropy?

What Do We Conclude?

We are not claiming that science fails to explain particular mechanisms locally: it excels at describing, modeling, and predicting the behavior of systems — whether cells, stars, or particles. But we are asserting that it does not explain the whole: it does not answer the foundational question. Why is there something rather than nothing? Why are the laws of physics stable? Why does the universe, instead of dissolving into random noise, manifest a cumulative direction capable of producing persistent order, complexity, and self-sustaining structures?

It is true — and not problematic — that modern sciences have compartmentalized each field: they operate in a specialized, localized, methodical fashion. But this methodological specialization should not prevent us from posing broader, more encompassing questions. Already in Aristotle, and in his successors — from Thomas Aquinas to Hans Jonas — we find this reflection on the organization of reality, on finality (or teleology), and on the stability of forms. What we call here teleostability does not seek to oppose science, but to remind it that there exists a wider horizon which human reason cannot simply discard without betraying its own vocation.

Faced with these questions, materialist positions often respond: “One must simply acknowledge what is; if it were not so, we wouldn’t be here to observe it.” But this response is a petitio principii — a circular argument: it presupposes precisely what it needs to explain. To refuse the question on the grounds that it lies outside science’s methodological scope is not to resolve it — it is to suspend rational inquiry.

It must be recalled that science itself rests on faith in the order and stability of reality. If the universe were fundamentally chaotic, with ever-shifting laws, no scientific endeavor could have arisen: no reproducible calculations, no generalizable experiments, no usable laws. In this sense, strict materialism depends on the intelligibility of the real in order to progress, while paradoxically refusing to question its ultimate origin.

Thus, far from being a lazy recourse or a “God-of-the-gaps,” the hypothesis of a unique, ordering, transcendent first principle appears as the most sober, rational, and coherent response — one that explains not merely local mechanisms, but the global framework that makes them possible. This recognition is not a superfluous addition to reality; it is the natural consequence of what reason demands when it questions the whole of the real.

In sum, it is not faith that fills a void — it is the refusal to ask the real questions that weakens thought. To recognize the hypothesis of a first cause is to open human intelligence to the very intelligibility of the universe. And perhaps therein lies the true alliance between reason, faith, and reality — an alliance that neither methodological compartmentalization nor materialist retreat can silence for long.

What Would a Strictly Materialist Universe Truly Look Like?

Let us imagine — not from a perspective of faith, but by strictly applying materialist logic, without any metaphysical addition, without any finality, without any transcendent order — what we should rationally expect from such a universe.

Step 1: The Scenario of Permanent ChaosIn this purely materialist world, there are only particles, fields, blind interactions. Even if, through an extraordinary alignment of chance, structures appear (chains of atoms, complex molecules), they are immediately subjected to environmental disruptions: collisions, radiation, energy fluctuations.Result: no lasting stability. This world is a sea of fleeting phenomena, without memory, without accumulation. Everything vanishes before it even begins.

Step 2: Locally Ordered but Non-Self-Maintaining ScenariosSuppose a local pocket of order arises: a molecule, a network, a structure. If this order is purely the product of brute chance, without any internal mechanism of self-correction or reproduction, it is doomed to disappear at the slightest disruption. Time may multiply “dice rolls,” but without internal teleonomy, no order persists or spreads.Result: improbable micro-islands, without continuity or legacy.

Step 3: The Miraculous Appearance of Brute StabilityLet us admit that an exceptional arrangement yields a stable structure. But this stability would be purely passive:

• It would contain no program of reproduction or active preservation.

• It would remain inert, incapable of prolonging or adapting itself.Result: a local miracle — a stone in the middle of chaos, without past or future.

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Step 4: Extending the Logic to the Laws ThemselvesHere the problem deepens. For the preceding scenarios require not only improbable material events but stable physical laws. Yet, if we apply materialist logic rigorously, the laws of the universe — fundamental constants, symmetries, force ratios — are themselves structures. Why should they be stable?

In a materialist framework, one must contemplate:

• Either a unique universe in which, by sheer accident, the laws took on stable and order-permitting values,

• Or an infinite multiverse where all combinations of laws are tested, and by chance, some (like ours) produce stable orders.

  
  

But in both cases, a major contradiction arises:– In a single universe, why should the laws themselves be stable? Why do the fundamental constants not fluctuate? Why does gravity not collapse? Why doesn’t electromagnetism suddenly vary? Nothing in physical forces guarantees their invariance over time. They simply are, and they persist. This astonishing fact remains entirely unexplained.

– In an infinite multiverse, we postulate endless trials. But even so, why would one land in a universe where the laws, once fixed, remain stable? Why do they not fluctuate constantly? An infinity of universes may generate all possible combinations — but also all scenarios in which laws oscillate without ever stabilizing. It is not enough to say “we eventually landed on the right one,” for one must still explain why this right universe continues to hold — and does not collapse the next instant.

The Casino Metaphor: Why Chance Explains Nothing Without a Prior Framework

Let us imagine that the universe is a vast casino. Those who defend the idea that “chance is sufficient” are essentially asserting this: given enough time, tokens, and spins, even the most improbable combinations will eventually appear. Why be surprised that order arises? In an eternal game, everything happens.

Yet mathematicians and probability theorists — from Blaise Pascal, pioneer of probability theory, to Andrey Kolmogorov, the father of modern probability foundations, and Leonard Savage or John von Neumann, who formalized game theory — all remind us of one essential truth: chance is never absolute chaos; it is always defined within a pre-established framework.

In reality, a casino is one of the least chaotic places on earth: each game, each roulette wheel, each slot machine operates according to fixed rules, a finite space of possibilities, and calculable probabilities. One can model every possible outcome, estimate odds, and project long-term returns (which always favor the house). Why? Because everything is structured, predefined, constrained by design: chance operates within a system — it does not replace it.

Without this structure — without rules, tables, mechanisms, or stable boundaries — there is no game at all. If the roulette wheel changed shape with each spin, if blackjack cards appeared and vanished at random, if slot machine symbols redefined themselves after each pull, the result would not be a game but a meaningless cacophony, where neither players nor house could predict or govern anything.

And so the metaphor reaches its heart: in the universe, as in a casino, speaking of chance already implies the existence of a structured arena in which that chance operates. To say that, given enough time, improbable events will emerge is to forget that those events always occur within a framework — one composed of stable laws, fixed constants, and predictable interactions. It is this framework that makes probability, calculation, and statistics even possible.

To fail to ask where this framework comes from — why there is a “cosmic gaming hall” at all, why the rules are stable, why universal constants do not endlessly fluctuate — is precisely like a gambler refusing to acknowledge the existence of the game board, the machines, and the croupiers, and insisting that all outcomes simply spring from nowhere.

And yet, even the most “chaotic” games in a casino are perfectly regulated — which is why mathematical models from Pascal to von Neumann describe them so effectively. All the more, in the real universe, one must ask: from where comes the frame that allows for the emergence of structured randomness and stable complexity?

In other words, to say that chance explains everything, without asking about the origin of the system in which it plays out, is like playing in a casino while denying the existence of its rules, tables, and machinery. Apparent chance always conceals a prior order. And it is this prior order — this “cosmic gaming architecture” — that constitutes the ultimate enigma which human reason must confront.

The Dawkins Case

It is striking how often the famous line from Richard Dawkins is brandished as an axiomatic argument. He writes:

“The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference.”(River Out of Eden, 1995)

For many of his followers, this is a rhetorical battering ram — not because of its internal logic, but because of its forceful phrasing. It is not a reasoned argument, but a declarative blow that seems to shut down all further metaphysical questioning.

And yet, what we intend to show is that this declaration, often wielded as a conversation-ender, in fact rests on a chain of unproven assumptions, arbitrary reductions, and philosophical amalgams. It functions more as a rhetorical device than a true rational refutation. By carefully deconstructing it, we shall see that it does not dismiss the hypothesis of a first principle — but instead exposes the limitations of a certain dogmatic materialism that refuses to pursue its own rationality when it comes to origins, finality, and cosmic stability.

Refutation:

1. Undemonstrated PresuppositionDawkins presumes to know what a godless universe must look like: cold, indifferent, void of moral or final significance.

   
   

→ But how can one know what a metaphysically unguided universe “should” resemble? No one has access to a comparative experience between a created universe and a creatorless one. This is therefore a gratuitous supposition — an unprovable assumption that presumes the very framework in dispute. It is a textbook example of begging the question.

2. Phenomenological ReductionDawkins reduces the universe to its most brutal aspects: suffering, indifference, blindness.

   
   

→ Yet the universe is not merely suffering and chaos — it also exhibits: stable physical laws, mathematical order, fine-tuned constants, emergent complexity, systemic self-organization, cumulative capability, consciousness, art, morality. Dawkins selects a single facet (apparent cruelty) and ignores the rest — especially the remarkable order and structure demanding explanation.

3. Neglect of the Teleostability ProblemAs we have shown with the objection of teleostability, the real enigma is not just why suffering exists — but why stable, cumulative order persists through and despite it. Saying the universe is indifferent does not explain the breathtaking endurance of physical constants, the harmonies of cosmic laws, or the conditions that allow life and mind to arise and continue.

   
   

4. Dogmatic Reasoning Masked as SkepticismIronically, Dawkins accuses believers of dogmatism, while here refusing to extend rational doubt to his own foundational assumptions. He stops short of questioning the ultimate basis: why order? why law? why being itself? His materialism halts precisely where reason should deepen — a retreat rather than a critical advance.

   
   

5. Tautological ReasoningDawkins falls into the familiar anthropic trap: we are here to observe the universe, so of course it permits life. But this is a logical loop, not an explanatory cause. It answers no “why” — only restates “what is.”

Why the Hypothesis of God Is Not a Tautology

Some may object: “But isn’t saying ‘God explains everything’ itself just another tautology? Doesn’t it amount to saying, ‘things are as they are because God willed them so’?”

Here is why this objection fails:

– A tautology is a vacuous statement that adds no explanatory value beyond what is already assumed (e.g., “things are as they are because they are as they are”).

– But the hypothesis of God, as we present it here, does not merely rephrase the facts — it introduces a transcendent explanatory principle, that is, a first cause, external to the system, which accounts not only for the present state of things but for their very existence, their order, their persistence, and their finality.

More precisely:

– We are not saying, “the universe exists because it exists,” but: “the universe exists, endures, and is ordered because it participates in a first act of being — stable, immutable, transcendent — which we call God.”

– This principle is not a disguised repetition of observed data, but an explanation of why there are laws rather than nothing, why these laws are stable, why the universe is intelligible rather than chaotic.

– Unlike circular reasoning (which loops endlessly within the system), the theistic hypothesis introduces an external and foundational cause, in line with the classical principle of metaphysical causality laid out by Aristotle and developed by Thomas Aquinas (notably in the Summa Contra Gentiles).

Thus, to speak of God in this context is not to slap a label on mystery to avoid thinking — it is to acknowledge the rational necessity of a first principle grounding being, order, finality, and stability. Far from being a tautology, it is a coherent explanatory hypothesis, distinct from empirical observation, that gives meaning to the whole framework — not merely to its internal mechanisms.

Final Conclusion: The Rational Necessity of a Unique, Ordering, and Transcendent Principle

The objection of teleostability, as we have formulated it, reveals far more than a localized problem regarding life’s endurance: it opens a metaphysical reflection of universal scope. For if we seriously ask why life persists in an entropic universe, we soon encounter a more encompassing horizon:Why do stable structures exist at all, through time? Why is there ordered matter, universal constants, coherent and homogeneous physical laws that remain valid across the ages, allowing for the appearance and preservation of all forms of organization?

Take one simple but decisive example: the universal gravitational constant. If this constant varied even slightly, galaxies would not form, stars would not hold together, planets would not maintain stable orbits, and no condition favorable to the emergence and persistence of life would exist. And yet, not only does this constant exist — it has remained astonishingly stable over billions of years. The same applies to the constants of the electromagnetic force, the weak and strong nuclear forces, the masses of elementary particles, and so forth. We are faced with a staggering coherence and stability.

Why are these laws as they are? Why are they stable? Classical materialist or scientistic approaches often respond awkwardly: “That’s just how it is,” or “The question is meaningless; we must simply observe the facts.” Some contemporary philosophers go so far as to say that asking why laws exist — or why there is being rather than nothing — is an anthropomorphic error, a psychological projection of our human tendency to seek causes and intentions where there are none.

But such a response is doubly unsatisfying.

First, to refuse a fundamental question because it exceeds the immediate domain of science is not to answer it. To dismiss a question because it is difficult or uncomfortable is not a rational move — it is a retreat. On the contrary, asking why — why matter, why law, why such stability — is not only legitimate, but rationally necessary for anyone who seeks to understand reality as a whole.

Second, to claim that such a question is invalid leads to a self-contradictory position. For if we assert that the human brain produces flawed, biased questions due to evolutionary habits, then how do we trust that same brain in its scientific, physical, or mathematical reasoning? To say that only metaphysical questions are contaminated by cognitive bias — while scientific reasoning remains pure — is an arbitrary distinction with no rational basis. If we accept deep inquiry in physics, we must also accept deep inquiry in metaphysics.

Finally, multiplying hypotheses (multiverses, infinite trials, random self-organization) complicates without resolving. Introducing an infinity of universes to explain a single local fact does not touch the root of the question: why does a general framework (a multiverse, a meta-law) exist at all that permits such stable configurations? Why are there stable laws in that meta-framework? We are merely postponing the issue, without ever addressing its core.

Ockham’s Razor — which demands that we prefer the simplest, most unified, and most complete explanation — invites us instead to consider a unique, stable, ordering, transcendent principle that accounts for being, order, the stability of laws, and the persistence of life. This unique cause, we call God — not a “God-of-the-gaps” inserted to patch scientific ignorance, but a first cause, a metaphysical foundation of the real, the intelligible principle of being, guarantor of order, finality, and continuity.

Catholic philosophy here offers a clear and rational framework: the universe exists, it is ordered, its laws are stable, life appears and endures — not by blind chance, but because it is sustained at every moment by a first act of being. Without this, we cannot explain why anything exists, why it holds together, nor why this order endures against ambient chaos.

In sum:To refuse the question is to renounce thought. To hide behind ever-heavier hypotheses or mute skepticism is to multiply complications without ever reaching the essential. To acknowledge, on the contrary, that there is a first, ordering, transcendent cause is to honor reason itself — and the intelligence of reality.

The objection of teleostability, extended to all of reality, thus leads us back to this profound truth:the universe is intelligible because it is grounded, sustained, and oriented by Intelligence.

This is not only the simplest metaphysical key — it is the most coherent and the most solid.